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I.  Introduction 
 
International development literature has been dominated by concurrent schools of thought 
ranging  from  the  neo-liberal‘s  market  dogma  to  the  Marxist  dependency  interpretation. 
Dependency  theorists  (Gunder  Frank,  Wallerstein,  Prebisch)  explain  the  economic 
development of a state in terms of external political, economic, and cultural influences on 
national development policies (Sunkel, 1969). It follows that dependency theory assumes 
that economic domination runs across north-south geoeconomic patterns. However, what 
the world is witnessing since the emergence of China as a global trade heavyweight is its 
unusual  position  within  the  center-periphery  framework.  That  is,  particularly  in  its 
economic and trade relations with Africa,
1 China does not fit the theoretical concept of 
center country, nor does it any longer fit the standard periphery nation. 
As regards Africa, China represents its third-largest market and accounts for 14 percent of 
African countries‘ total exports in 2006 (compared to 1 percent in early 1990s). In addition, 
it has become the third-largest source of Africa‘s imports, accounting for 9 percent of the 
import total  (compared  to  3  percent  a  decade  ago).   Not only  has  demand  from  China 
helped support primary commodities prices, it has also depressed Africa‘s import prices, 
which has ultimately contributed to the recent African economic growth. 
While not a new phenomenon, China‘s involvement in African affairs has changed over 
time. At the time of the 1955 Bandung Conference, the China-Africa relationship was anti-
US,  hegemonic,  and  anti-imperialist,  a  stance  that  led  to  China‘s  involvement  in  and 
support of liberation struggles in many African countries. Nevertheless, this link involved 
no  significant  trade  flows,  nor  could  it  trigger  African  development.  However,  since 
Beijing‘s late 1990s announcement of its ―going global‖ policy, which includes large firms 
expanding their exploration into investment opportunities in Africa, a new, economically 
focused trend has emerged. For example, in November 2006, at the Beijing summit of the 
Forum  of  China-African  Cooperation,  China  expressed  its  commitment  to  win-win 
perspectives in its economic exchange with Africa. Yet the capitalist mode of production is 
often characterized by increasing tensions and divides because, in theory, core countries, as 
owners of capital, have built-in advantages over periphery nations and workers. However, 
this  inequality  does  not  in  itself  lead  to  exploitation:  it  is  the  essential  foundation  that 
makes exploitation possible. Therefore, it must be asked whether  it is truly possible for 
China to treat Africa in a nonexploitative way. Moreover, how should the emergence of 
China in its relationship with Africa be interpreted within the center-periphery discourse, 
and how can the dialectic relationship evolve into an acceptable development outcome for 
both sides?  
To  address  these  questions,  this  essay  relies  heavily  on  both  the  dependency  and 
imperialism theses,
2 and attempts to explain  current China-Africa relations by examining 
                                                             
1 Africa in this paper refers to the sub-Saharan African region. 
2 The Marxist theory of imperialism explains dominant state  expansion,  while  the  dependency 
theory  explains  underdevelopment.  In  other  words,  Marxist  theories  explain  why  imperialism 3 
 
the patterns of their interactions. The central thesis is that the China-Africa economic links 
represent a distinct south-south dialectic relation, which is taking place in an emerging new 
global economic configuration marked by a technology gap. Because technology is a key 
factor  in  changing  the  economic  process  of  production,  only  changes  in  the  economic 
foundation  can  transform  and  move  the  entire  relationship  away  from  the  conventional 
dependency system and closer to the emerging, yet undefined, Beijing Consensus (Ramo, 
2004). 
An appreciation of the above dialectic is of academic and political interest, particularly for 
Marxist dependency theorists; most particularly, because recent discussion on the China-
Africa economic links  has often overlooked the technological gap that may account for 
much  of  Africa‘s  inevitable  dependency.  Thus,  analyzing  the  development  of  relations 
between China and Africa  in the light of this technological gap is a crucial priority for 
modern dependency thought. Only by careful analysis of the relations through such a lens 
can  the  common  interests  in  both  Africa  and  China  be  made  clear,  thereby  laying  the 
foundation for unity between them in confronting the global system that ties them together.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of center-
periphery theories  in a global economic  integration context. Section 3 then outlines the 
economic characteristics of the China-Africa link, after which Section 4 seeks evidence of 
dependency  features  within  this  connection.  Finally,  Section  5  concludes  the  paper  by 
exploring relevant issues pertaining to better management of the dialectic relations between 
capital and labor both between China and Africa and within the latter. 
II.  Brief review of dependency theories 
Neoclassical thought, in all its variations, sees the process of international trade as a path to 
increasing wealth for the countries involved, which also means that the resultant economic 
growth  is  beneficial  to  all  (Pareto optimal)  even  if  the  benefits  are  not  always  equally 
shared.  However, whereas it is true that trade can create an aggregate increase in wealth, in 
a  world  of  mobile  capital,  wealth  gain  is  in  no  way  automatically  distributed  evenly 
between  trading  partners.  Rather,  as  Karl  Marx  pointed  out  in  the  nineteenth  century, 
capitalism is inherently contradictory in its creation of two primary classes—the capitalists 
who own the means of production and the proletariat who must sell their labor to survive. 
Thus, as Marx argued in Das Capital, accumulation of wealth at one pole is inherently a 
simultaneous accumulation of misery at the opposite pole. This viewpoint has since been 
extended into the arena of international trade and development by dependency theorists. 
One seminal assumption of dependency theory is that the interdependent relations between 
two or more economies take the form of dependence when some countries (i.e., dominant 
nations) can expand and be self-sustaining while other (dependent) countries can do so only 
as a reflection of this expansion, which  may affect their  immediate development either 
positively  or  negatively  (Dos  Santos,  1970).  Therefore,  dependence  is  not  simply  an 
external relation between a dependent economy and its capitalist metropolis. Rather, it has 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
occurs,  while  dependency  theories  explain  its  consequences  (Milios,  2007).  This  difference  is 
significant in the framework of the present paper. 4 
 
the  most profound and  far-reaching  ideological  and psychological  manifestations  in the 
form  of  inferiority  complexes  and  assimilation  of  the  metropolitan  ideology  and 
development theory (Frank, 1972). Hence, development and underdevelopment constitute 
simply the two opposite poles of one and the same process: development of some nations 
(i.e.,  the  imperialist  countries)  presupposes,  or  even  causes,  the  underdevelopment  of 
dependent countries, which are subjected to imperialist exploitation (Milios, 2007) through 
international  trade.  Most  particularly,  since  many  developing  nations  currently  lack  an 
intercountry market place, their economies rely heavily on the economies of more advanced 
societies,  which  in  turn  gives  Western  societies  great  control  over  the  less  developed 
nations‘ economies.  
Another tenet of the dependency literature, the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, insist on the 
persistent  deterioration  in  the  net  barter  terms  of  trade  between  primary  products  and 
manufacturing,  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  relative  price  of  primary  goods  to 
manufactured goods should decline in the long-run (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950). The net 
barter terms of the trade index are calculated as the ratio of the relative change in the price 
of the exported goods and services basket to that of the corresponding import basket (of one 
country). Through capitalist control of world commodity markets, the index is expected to 
continually  deteriorate,  making  it  hard  for  countries  in  the  periphery  to  emerge 
economically. 
Specifically, according to the international division of labor in a capitalistic framework, 
dependent states focus on supplying cheap minerals, agricultural commodities, and cheap 
labor  while  serving  as  repositories  for  supply  capital,  obsolescent  technologies,  and 
manufactured goods. These functions orient the economies of the dependent states toward 
the outside; that is, the allocation of the money, goods, and services that flow into these 
states is determined by the economic interests of the dominant states not the dependent state. 
Not only does this division of labor ultimately explain poverty, but there is little question 
that capitalism regards this division as a necessary condition for the efficient allocation of 
resources.  The  most  explicit  manifestation  of  this  characteristic  is  in  the  doctrine  of 
comparative advantage. 
It is important to note that today dependency is taking place amid powerful transnational 
institutions that are both setting international trade rules and supervising transactions flows. 
Thus, the bilateral center-periphery relationship is also affected by capitalist influence on 
transnational institutions (e.g., the WTO, IMF, UN, World Bank) and its direct power on 
the periphery. Indeed, Werner and Trefler (1997) argue that, together with the removal of 
Keynesian state regulation, the rising integration of world markets has brought with it a 
disintegration of the production process, in which manufacturing or services activity abroad 
is  combined  with  that  performed  at  home.  As  a  result,  companies  are  now  finding  it 
profitable to outsource increasing amounts of a production process that can as easily take 
place  overseas  as  domestically.  It  follows  that  this  global  fragmentation  of  production, 
splitting of production process into discrete activities across countries, represents a shift in 
capital-labor relations, which are no longer mediated by the state. The implication is that 5 
 
global  production  rather  than  exports  would  better  explained  today‘s  center-periphery 
rapport.   
In  addition,  Burbach  and  Robinson  (1999)  point  especially  to  this  dispersal  of 
manufacturing capacity to developing countries as being among the forces eliminating the 
structural divide between the center and the peripheries. That is, worldwide convergence 
through the global restructuring of capitalism means that the geographic breakdown of the 
world  into  north-south  and  core-periphery,  while  still  significant,  is  diminishing  in 
importance. Such a change at the infrastructural level implies corresponding changes at the 
superstructural  and  technological  levels.  In  fact,  the  most  critical  aspect  of  this  entire 
dependent relationship could well be technological dependence. 
Because of the vital role of technology in the life of any nation, its control, whether direct 
or indirect,  implies effective dominance of all other aspects of national  life.  Moreover, 
Darity and Davis (2005) argue that technology transfer is just one more area through which 
the center consolidates its economic and cultural domination over the periphery. In moving 
away  from the rather traditional  view of technology as  a global, and thus exogenously 
determined, public good, the new growth theory embraces dimensions of technology that 
may  differ  across  countries.  Thus,  as  the  other  means  of  production,  the  control  of 
technology  or  its  exclusive  mastery  by  one  class  or  country  can  also  justify  uneven 
development. 
In the above respect, Vernengo (2004) observes that at the core of the dependency relation 
between center and periphery lies the inability of the latter to develop an autonomous and 
dynamic  process  of  technological  innovation.  As  a  result,  centre  countries  control 
technology and the systems for generating it, once again putting technology at center stage. 
Nor can foreign capital solve this problem, since it leads only to limited transmission of 
technology not to the process of innovation itself.  
This dependent relationship spans the economic and cultural spheres, especially in former 
colonies in which the values of the colonizers have been internalized and have grown deep 
roots. In such contexts, industrialized countries‘ interests have developed powerful local 
constituencies solidly  bound  by  ideological umbilical  links.  As a result, the  freedom to 
explore alternative paths to development has been narrowly confined for most developing 
nations (Chamarik and Goonatilake, 1994). Thus, cultural dependence has its roots in the 
very  economic  relationship  that  forms  the  so-called  economic  structure of  a  dependent 
society. Because, as Hegel (1991) noted, a system of ideas is only a reflection of mans‘ 
social activities not reality itself, by controlling economic activities and participation in the 
formation of the social structure, Western imperialists can control the ideas generated in the 
dependent country.  
A  final  noteworthy  factor  is  that  dependency  theory  assumes  that  such  economic 
domination runs across north-south geoeconomic patterns. However, as already pointed out, 
since its emergence as a global trade heavyweight, China has come to represent an unusual 
position within the center-periphery framework. That is, China does not fit the theoretically 6 
 
constructed pattern of either a center or a periphery nation, particularly in its relations with 
Africa. 
 
III.  Recent developments in China-Africa economic relations 
Over the last decade, growth rates in Africa have accelerated for the first time since the 
early  1970s  thanks  to  China-driven  commodity  prices.  This  factor  has  made  China‘s 
involvement in Africa over the past decade one of the most significant recent developments 
in the region. Above all, over the last decade, China  has become one of Africa‘s  most 
important partners for trade and economic cooperation.  Not only did trade (exports and 
imports) between Africa and China increase from US$11 billion in 2000 to US$56 billion 
in 2006, but the share of Africa‘s exports to China rose from 1.3 percent in 1995 to 9.3 
percent in 2004. Admittedly, this latter was accompanied by a significant decline in African 
exports to OECD countries during the same period; nevertheless, an estimated 70 percent of 
Africa‘s $435 billion world trade is still with the EU compared to only 10 percent with 
China (Lammers, 2007). 
The profile of goods traded in the China-Africa relationship has also changed. Whereas 
during  the  1980s  and  1990s,  China  exported  mostly  clothing,  footwear,  and  light 
manufactured goods, during the first five years of the twenty-first century, it has shifted 
toward higher technology exports, like electronic goods and machinery, which now account 
for close to 50 percent of its exports (World Bank, 2007).  In turn, China‘s imports from 
Africa are primarily crude oil, iron ore, cotton, diamonds, and other natural resources and 
primary goods. Thus, for those African countries without much oil or many raw materials 
to export, trade with China is less mutually complementary, which results in a rise in their 
trade deficit (Guixan, 2006). According to the World Bank (2007), noncommodity exports 
from  Africa  to  China  are  insignificant,  accounting  for  less  than  10  percent  of  African 
exports.  These  exports—which  include  textiles  and  apparel,  processed  food,  and  small 
manufactured goods—tend to be technologically simple and are either intermediate inputs, 
as in the case of textiles, or finished consumer goods.  
Recently,  China  has  been  further  diversifying  into  the  apparel,  food  processing, 
telecommunications,  and  construction  sectors.  However,  Chinese  FDI  in  Africa  is  still 
comparatively  small  since  Africa  accounts  for  only  3  percent  of  China‘s  outward  FDI 
(Economy  and  Monaghan,  2006).  Nevertheless,  even  though  Chinese  investments  are 
concentrated in only a few African countries, China´s FDI stock in Africa reached US$1.6 
billion in 2005, with Chinese companies present in 48 African countries, of which Sudan is 
the  largest  recipient  and  ninth  largest  recipient  of  Chinese  FDI  worldwide  (UNCTAD, 
2007). 
This Chinese influx definitely benefits African economies. Most especially, commodities 
used in manufacturing, such as oil, copper and platinum, are surging because of demand 
from China and other Asian nations. Consequently, copper prices have increased sixfold 
since a 2001 low, topping $8,000 per ton in some recent trading, and platinum prices have 
tripled over the same period. At the same time, the availability of Chinese motorcycles, air 7 
 
conditioners, T-shirts, and kitchen utensils  has  meant  lower  consumer prices across the 
continent,  while  in  South  Africa,  two  companies  are  planning  to  introduce  Chinese 
automobiles to the bustling domestic market at discount prices (Timberg, 2006)  
In  January  2006,  the  Chinese  government  released  its  official  African  Policy  which 
specifically  ―encourages  and  supports  Chinese  enterprises‘  investment  and  business  in 
Africa,  and  will  continue  to  provide  preferential  loans  and  buyers‘  credits to this  end‖  
(China‘s African Policy, 2006). In this regard, China announced new infrastructure projects, 
including  dam  construction  projects  in  Ghana  and  Mozambique  and  a  communication 
satellite  in  Nigeria.  This  latter,  launched  in  May  2007,  is  expected  to  offer 
telecommunications,  broadcasting,  and  broadband  multimedia  services  for  Africa 
throughout the next 15 years. China, which expects annual trade with Africa to total $100 
billion (£53bn) by 2010, has  long said that it wants  its growing trade relationship with 
Africa to benefit both sides equally. Thus, the Chinese government promotes business ties 
with Africa by providing information, coordination mechanisms, and financial assistance 
for  Chinese  companies  and  investors  in  Africa  (Gill  and  Reilly,  2007).  For  example, 
Chinese construction firms operating in Africa receive export credit for feasibility studies, 
government guarantees for bank loans, export credits for financing the operational cost of 
projects, and lines of credit for capital goods and machinery. Such government support was 
listed by Chinese firms as the second most important factor in their decision to invest in 
Africa, following the pursuit of new markets. 
In 2000, the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) founded the China-Africa 
Joint  Business  Council,  which  provides  government  support  for  investment  by  Chinese 
enterprises in African countries and establishes an array of economic partnerships. At the 
2006 FOCAC, China pledged $3 billion in preferential loans and $2 billion in export credits 
to African states over the next three years, created a special fund of $5 billion to encourage 
Chinese  investment  in  Africa,  and  established  the  China-Africa  Joint  Chamber  of 
Commerce (Gill and Reilly, 2007). China also pledged to cancel African debt, increase 
from 190 to over 440 the number of export items to China receiving zero-tariff treatment 
from the least developed countries in Africa with diplomatic ties to China, set up 10 special 
agricultural  technology  demonstration  centers  in  Africa,  and  increase  the  number  of 
Chinese government scholarships to African students from the current 2,000 per year to 
4,000 per year by 2009. 
As  regards  trade  issues,  China‘s  African  Policy  (2006)  announces  that  the  Chinese 
government  is  taking  steps  to  adopt  more  effective  measures  to  facilitate  African 
commodities‘ access to the Chinese market. It also asserts that China will fulfill its promise 
to grant duty-free treatment to some goods from the least developed African countries with 
a view to expanding and balancing bilateral trade and optimizing trade structure.  
Financial transactions, although still insignificant, are also increasingly taking the stage. 
For instance, in December 2006, Standard Chartered, one of the largest foreign banks in 
Nigeria  with  6,000  employees  in  Africa,  launched  the  China-Africa  Trade  Corridor,  a 
bundle  of  services  for  Chinese  SMEs  bidding  to  ―go  global.‖  Standard  Chartered  has 
already  drawn  up  detailed  plans  to  tap  into  the  estimated  $50  billion  in  annual  trade 8 
 
between China and Africa, which has proven a boon to Chinese companies striving to sate 
the country‘s appetite for natural resources (Kleinman, 2007). Late in October 2007, the 
Industrial and Commercial  Bank of China (ICBC) purchased a 20% stake in the South 
Africa's Standard Bank (Africa‘s largest bank by assets) in a $5.5 billion deal; making the 
operation the biggest foreign investment ever by a Chinese bank. Since Standard Bank has 
a presence in 17 other African countries, ICBC is going to access new channel and local 
expertise to facilitate further penetration into African economies.   
Despite  the  numerous  Chinese-originated  initiatives,  the  African  economic  and  trade 
structure is still clearly neocolonial or Europe oriented. As a result, emerging structural 
change (although still insignificant) is already engendering tensions with elites based on 
neocolonial  interests  versus  those  promoting  the  mounting  Chinese  links,  including  the 
Chinese  operating  locally  in  Africa.  Officially,  about  15  percent  of  the  total  overseas 
Chinese  workforce  is  currently  serving  in  Africa,  with,  as  of  2005,  approximately  35 
percent employed in manufacturing and close to 30 percent in construction (Gong, 2007).   
Although there is some evidence that the economic activities of Chinese entrepreneurs can 
make  a  positive  contribution  to  local  development,  the  presence  of  Chinese  firms  is 
bringing about fierce competition because most African producers simply cannot undercut 
Chinese production costs and prices and compete with Chinese companies even in Africa‘s 
domestic markets. Even worse, Chinese firms are being accused of dumping practices. At 
the same time, local retailers are faced with rapidly increasing business competition from 
expatriate  Chinese  traders  (Brautigam,  2003).  In  addition,  Chinese  firms  are  sharply 
competitive  with  one  another,  which  forces  them  to  cut  costs  by  lowering  wages  and 
working conditions and safety standards (Gill and Reilly, 2007). One result of this latter has 
been frequent strikes at Chinese construction and manufacturing firms in Africa. In fact, the 
South African textile industry is complaining that the large influx of cheap Chinese textiles, 
clothes,  and  shoes  has  caused  unemployment  and  the  closedown  of  local  factories.  In 
addition, such influx of affordable Chinese textiles has resulted in intense competition for 
South African textile export in third market (Guixan, 2006). 
Above all, globalization and rapid capital mobility has changed the bargaining positions of 
labor and capital. While the position of Chinese capital has been strengthened—if under 
pressure, it can seek opportunities outside Africa—labor has been placed in a weakened 
position.  For  example,  when  the  US-sponsored  African  Growth  and  Opportunity  Act 
(AGOA) came into effect in 2000, a considerable number of Chinese textile companies 
established themselves in Africa to exploit the preferential access to the US market that 
AGOA conceded to certain African products, including clothing and textiles. However, in 
recent years, American demand for African textiles has plunged in favor of even cheaper 
clothing  made  in  China;  and  by  2005,  Africa-based  Chinese  companies  were  already 
relocating their production back to China (IMF, 2005). In the process, tens of thousands of 
workers in, for example, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Kenya, lost their jobs (Tull, 
2006).  South Africa alone recorded a 45 percent decrease in clothing exports. As a result, 
its trade deficit with China widened. Thus, the structure of South Africa‘s trade relations 9 
 
with China  mirrors the wider problem of Africa‘s unbalanced trade relations  in that 90 
percent of South African exports to China consist of raw materials (Tull, 2006).  
Conversely, China‘s contribution to the expansion of the business network in Africa can be 
felt across the continent. Specifically, as shown by Brautigam (cited in Lammers, 2007), 
expanding Chinese business networks in Africa can serve as a catalyst for local industrial 
development, as in the case of the West African cotton growers  who have benefited from 
increased exports to China. Nevertheless, most observers today share the concern that by 
purchasing raw materials from the African continent and selling value-added products back, 
China‘s increased involvement will create an unfavorable trade balance for many African 
countries. 
Together  with  its  intention  to  facilitate trade,  improve  access  to  natural  resources,  and 
recycle its massive foreign exchange reserves into profitable investments overseas, China 
has started an active aid program to Africa. For instance, in 2002, China provided $1.8 
billion in development aid to its African allies. China has also used debt relief to assist 
African nations, effectively turning loans into grants. Besides writing off $1.2 billion in 
African debt in 2000 and forgiving another $750 million in 2003, since 2000, Beijing has 
taken significant steps to cancel the debt of 31 African countries (World Bank, 2007). Also, 
in September-October 2007, in the largest deal with an African country, China signed, via 
China Exim Bank and China Development Bank, respectively, a US$8.5 billion and US$5 
billion  loans  to the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo  (DRC) to  develop  mines  and  build 
infrastructure. 
Although China‘s financing infrastructures in Africa helps in removing one of the major 
obstacles  to  the  region‘s  economic  growth,  like  assistance  from  nearly  all  aid-giving 
governments, it is tied to certain political and strategic interests—for example, dissuading 
governments from providing diplomatic recognition to Taiwan (Lancaster, 2007).  In the 
same token, even though the growth of Chinese export credit in Africa provides African 
governments with alternative sources of finance and helps diversify trading partners for 
countries  that  have  tended  to remain  stuck  in  old  colonial  patterns, China‘s  foray  into 
Africa—notably  that  for  natural  resources—has  prompted  accusations  of  modern  day 
colonialism. The validity of this capitalist exploitation perspective is examined in the next 
section in the light of dependency theories. 
 
IV. Diagnosing the dependence hypothesis in China-Africa relations  
This analysis is carried out in two stages. First, it compares the prominent features of the 
China-Africa relationship against the much-cited center-periphery characteristics. Second, 
in a comparison of the technological components in the two regions, it searches for any 
indication of an alternative channel for unequal development and explores possible avenues 
for Africa to escape the dependency trap. 
 10 
 
Politico-economic channel of dependency 
Table  1  compares  the  Chinese  approach  to  Africa  with  the  traditional  dependency  of 
African links to world capitalist nations in general. This comparison raises the following 
question:  Does  the  entry  of  China  into  Africa  represent  a  structural  and  fundamental 
transformation of the standard dependency features?  
First, in the area of trade composition, there is little evidence of a significant change in the 
export/import patterns. For instance, South African President Thabo Mbeki has warned the 
continent about the danger of replicating its historical relationship with its former colonial 
powers by simply exporting raw materials to China while importing Chinese manufactured 
goods.  The  lack  of  economic  structural  reconversion  does  not  support  the  long  run 
economic growth that the continent badly need. Primary commodities will eventually run 
out,  leaving  the  continent  without  any  viable  alternative.  Further,  as  asserted  by 
dependency theories, reliance on export of primary commodities does not expand the value 
added of exported products, which thus prevent countries from generating rapid economic 
growth similar to China‘s current experience.   
Table 1. China-Africa approach vs. standard center-periphery theory 
  Dependency aspects  China‘s approach  Standard approach 
1.  African export composition & 
terms of trade (TT) 
Primary commodity 
exports/capital good imports 
TT (+) 
Primary commodity 
exports/capital good imports 
TT (-) 
2.  Investment ownership  Mainly state-owned enterprises  Mainly private enterprises 
3.  Power relationship (cooperation 
type) 
South-south (equal, partners)  North-south (unequal, 
subordination) 
4.  Technology and labor  No substantial training  Limited in-house training 
5.  Superstructure (political) 
/ideology (elite links) 
Commonalities, less pressure  Interferences/conditionalities 
6.  Financial-monetary dominance  Low  High (PEG/de facto 
dollarization) 
7.  Perception of the African market  Potential market  Economically marginal 
 
Whereas state-owned enterprises concentrate on market penetration and apparent good will, 
in recent years, some Chinese private investors have displayed typically capitalistic and 
exploitative behavior. For instance, when the quotas on Chinese exporters were lifted in 
January 2005, African clothing and textile exporters that had benefited from the AGOA 
were severely hit. 
Further, even though it is true that Africa is supplying China with cheap minerals and is 
serving  as  a  repository  for  manufactured  goods,  because  China  itself  is  a  cheap-labor 
country, the expected supply of cheap labor and agriculture commodities commonly found 
in dependency-relationship barely apply in this case. Moreover, there is no evidence that 
Africa is serving as the repository for surplus capital.   11 
 
In  addition,  China‘s  tremendous  economic  growth  has  been  accompanied  by  an 
unprecedented improvement in Africa‘s net barter terms of trade (106.6 points as compared 
to the base year 1995; UNTCAD, 2006), which contradicts one core element of dependency 
theory, the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis of a persistent deterioration in the net barter terms of 
trade between primary and manufactured products. 
However,  because  Africa‘s  exports  to  China  are  mostly  limited  to  capital-intensive 
commodities, the possibility that textile imports from China will undermine African job 
markets and the effects of Africa‘s creating jobs in China cannot be ruled out. Given that 
Chinese  firms  often  import  their  own  labor,  which  limits  spillover  effects  in  African 
economies, such job creation, despite its roots in legitimate market competition, may result 
in unequal development between the two regions.  
Second, China‘s  role  in  post-war  African  settings  operates  largely  through  state-owned 
enterprises and other companies rather than NGOs, and through businessmen, engineers, 
and laborers rather than development consultants and volunteers. Indeed, Servant (2005) 
argues that because Chinese traders and retailers investing in Africa are heavily subsidized 
by state-owned enterprises with low capital costs and low profitability margins, they tend 
either to own equity in the resource or pursue long-term supply contracts and have different 
risk profiles from typical capitalists. As it is, this way of doing business by Chinese firms is 
seen by experts , particularly Lyman (2005),  as a challenge to the way that US firms have 
operated and for that reason China‘s investments represent a new approach to business. 
Two-thirds of China‘s imports from Africa are from oil, and China‘s major oil companies 
are  state  owned.  Therefore,  these  companies  act  as  an  extended  arm  of  the  Chinese 
government,  which  supports  their  overseas  activities  through  diverse  instruments.  For 
example, Chinese oil firms have easy access to cheap capital and state-directed lending 
through  the  China  Development  Bank  and  the  China  Export  Import  Bank  (Evans  and 
Downs,  2006).  Hence,  these  Chinese  firms  evidently  have  different  priorities  vis-à-vis 
profitability, growth, and economic development. 
Third,  Africa  is  still  largely  linked  to  the  colonial  ruling  capitalist  classes  in  their 
antagonism and struggle with the laboring classes. Moreover, as Lammers (2007) observes, 
China‘s  approach  to  Africa  is  a  continuation  under  new  circumstances  of  the  Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence adopted at the 1955 Bandung Conference. That is, it is a 
policy based on noninterference and respect for sovereignty, equality, and mutual benefit. 
Pursuing  the  above  stance,  during  the  Forum  on  China-Africa  Cooperation  (FOCAC; 
Beijing, 4–5 November, 2006), China adopted a declaration that proclaimed ―a new type of 
strategic partnership.‖ 
One  indication  that  China  is  trying  to  deepen  its  partnership  with  Africa  in  its  global 
economic quest is evidenced by the shift from fulfilling simple need to supplying China 
with the raw materials to set up joint global capitalistic firms targeting the world market. 
For example, at the Beijing summit, China and South Africa concluded a deal  to establish a 
joint company to expand ferrochrome production with the clear intention of making money 
rather than  supplying  metal  to  China.  At  this  time,  the  chairman  of  the  South  African 12 
 
partner was quoted as saying that ―Sinosteel is a trading organisation, and Tubatse Chrome 
will be a profit-driven company. If China offers the best price we will sell it to China, but 
we will sell to wherever we can get the best price‖ (Manji and Marks, 2007). In contrast, it 
is unlikely that European capitalists would consider going global with African firms, so, 
given  China‘s  willingness  to  facilitate  the  entry  of  African  companies  (African  Policy, 
2006), African firms are actively seeking business opportunities in China. 
Fourth,  there  are  also  concerns  about  some  Chinese-funded  projects  in  which  the 
percentage ratio of Chinese expatriates contracted (labor and enterprises) to locals is as 
high as 70 to 30 percent. This practice does not help Africa  in  terms of  increasing the 
availability of a skilled labor force. Indeed, overall, rather than investing heavily in training 
and education of African workers, Chinese firms tend to rely on their own low-cost labor. 
This lack of Chinese investment in indigenous manufacturing, coupled with low production 
of intermediate goods in Africa, has generated fears of deindustrialization. As a result, this 
practice impedes employment opportunities, technical skills transfer, and spillover effects 
from Chinese investment.  Such an approach is also unlikely to assist growth in Africa‘s 
private sector, either technically or financially (Rocha, 2007).  
In addition, African labor unions and workers‘ condition have already been badly damaged 
by the 1980s‘ structural adjustment programs and have become further enslaved within the 
neoliberal self-imposed framework of NEPAD (the New Economic Partnership for African 
Development). By accepting these two capitalist credos, African states have damaged their 
labor unions and retreated from what Marx viewed as the state‘s role—namely, to give a 
political form to economic institutions and production relations. As a result of this latter, 
the economics of capital cannot be isolated from the transformation of class relations and of 
states.  Moreover,  without  state  mediation  in  the  face  of  continuously  weakening  labor 
unions, there would also have been no reason, on the part of Chinese capitalism, for China 
to  contribute  to  increasing  labor  productivity  and  to  force  the  pace  of  technological 
progress. Therefore, it can be argued that, partly as a result of the antilabor policies initially 
implemented, the Chinese approach differs little from that of capitalist firms.  
In this respect, it should also be noted that the progress of the capitalist economies resulted 
from the historical interaction of capital accumulation and profit maximization, on the one 
hand, and the increased—and state-mediated—social power of the workers‘ movement, on 
the other (Massarrat, 2003). It is this conflict between the economic forces of production 
and the social relations of production that drives the basic development of capitalist society. 
Fifth,  the onset of the African economic crisis  at the beginning of the 1980s triggered 
attacks on the social policies of the post-colonial state under pressures and conditionalities 
that are absent from China‘s pragmatic aid. This attack on the social sectors was carried 
further and transformed into a dogma in the context of the IMF/World Bank‘s structural 
adjustment programs. 
Thus, the emerging China-Africa links challenge the shared belief spread by the World 
Bank and IMF as a range of neoliberal economic policies that are often implemented under 
heavy conditionality. It is therefore no wonder that China‘s achievement—the lifting of 400 13 
 
million  people  out  of  poverty  in  two  decades  without  externally  enforced  structural 
adjustment  programs—has  bolstered  African  countries‘  optimism  that  that  the  Western 
model  is  not  sacrosanct  and  they  too  can  devise  their  own  development  paths  and 
( Lammers. 2007).  
Indeed, Blazquez-Lidoy et al. (2004) point out that perhaps the most important aspect of the 
Chinese  development  model  (i.e.,  the  Beijing  Consensus)  is  an  approach  to  global 
relationships  that  seeks,  in  multinational  relationships,  a  new  global  order  founded  on 
economic relationships, one that still recognizes politico-cultural differences and variations 
in regional and national practices within a common global framework. Such an approach 
also differs from the standard center-periphery characterized by permanent interference in 
the  periphery‘s  economic  affairs.  Rather,  China  has  constantly  repeated  its  policy  of 
noninterference in internal political affairs. In fact, one major irony is that China has been 
widely criticized for abiding by its noninterference principle throughout the Darfur (Sudan) 
crisis. China's non-interference stance does not fit into the conventional control mechanism 
of local elites by core countries. Very often the local elite (as intermediary between the 
dominant core capitalist class and the local workers) often collide with international capital 
at  the  expense  of  domestic  workers.  China  is  dealing  with  the  local  elite  not  through 
forceful domination but through the consensus-based means of economic and diplomatic 
leadership. Although China is sending profit-seeking firms that behave capitalistically in 
Africa, there is no evidence that China is trying to set up a clientelist club like the infamous 
French Francafrique network. In addition, Chinese leaders have repeatedly said that their 
aid program is not a form of charity but is based on ―mutual benefit.‖   
Furthermore,  contrary  to  the  European  political  and  ideological  control  of  African 
economies and despite China‘s early links to African revolutionary struggles, there is still 
no evidence that  China  is trying to build  military  bases or stage military coups against 
African governments. Growing Chinese investments in Africa should have gone alongside 
with  increasing  military  presence  as  a  means  of  preserving  potential  risks  of 
expropriation/nationalization  and  preventing  any  challenges.  China‘s  lack  of  military 
presence proportional to its investment and interest in Africa could be seen as a new feature 
in global economic links. 
Sixth, imperialistic exploitation does not operate without the control of money. In other 
words, typical center-periphery capitalism is inconceivable without its financial medium 
and channels. As yet, however, China is not influencing the monetary policy of any African 
countries it is linked to, nor is it either trying to establish its own version of CFA currency 
or encourage the official or parallel reminbization of African economies. Likewise, African 
countries are not (yet?) stuck into Chinese related debt burden, which would otherwise 
provide China with opportunities for imposing the kind of structural adjustment policies on 
Africa. Besides, China‘s influence inside those multilateral institutions behind economic 
and development agenda (i.e. IMF, World Bank, WTO) in Africa is very limited.  
Seventh, unlike advanced capitalist economies, China certainly does not regard Africa as an 
economically marginal region but rather sees it as a potential future market for consumer 
goods. Contrary to European tendency to view Africa as a mere source of raw material and 14 
 
a  sort  of  humanitarian  market  where  only  NGOs  are  interested  in,  China  is  actively 
investing  in  huge  infrastructure  projects that  have  been  neglected  by  both  bilateral  and 
multilateral donors. Chinese firms are actively involved in creating/expanding markets for 
their  products  in  Africa;  an  attitude  which  contradicts  the  lack  of  interests  by  western 
multinationals that see African  market as either too small or lacking potential demands 
required for a fast return on investment. 
In sum, the overall evidence fails to support the idea that China‘s involvement in Africa is 
of a center-periphery type. Of course, areas such as trade composition, labor issues, and the 
China-Africa  production  structure  require  further  examination  because  the  production 
structure can also explain the asymmetric distribution of value between the two regions. As 
Figure 1 shows, what is crucial  for  Africa  is the shift  from  its traditional raw  material 
exports  into  a  basic  manufacturing  integration  in  its  integration  with  China.  So  far 
economic  linkages  between  the  two  regions  are  limited  to  cross-border  flows  of  raw 
materials, which is knows for insignificant externalities and value creation. Only making 
the  continent  into  Africa2,  manufacturer  can  further  deep  integration‘  (institutions  that 
facilitate  trade,  exploit  externalities  and  correct  market  failures)  and  allow  valuable 
feedback and externalities, regardless of whether china is a Center or still a periphery. The 
relationships between local producers and global lead firms in the value chains can include 
a whole range of relationships, spanning from arm‘s-length or market-based relationships to 
hierarchy. 
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As Figure 1 also illustrates, because of the increasing integration of the production process, 
individual firms incorporated into such a system have no room within it for the autonomous 
action central to the potential for technological upgrading and, thus, for sustained economic 
development (Henderson et al., 2001). Moreover, shifting the manufacturing division of 
labor is likely to hurt the subsequent economy in the production network. That is, when 
low-productivity countries catch up, the large shifts in the international division of labor 
and changes in their own economic structures that rich countries‘ sometimes fear (van de 
Klundert and Smulders, 1996) may be realized. For instance, European capitalists have had 
to resort to corruption, military presence, military coups, and support for fake democratic 
process in such countries as Togo, Gabon, Cameroon, the DR Congo, and Nigeria. 
Technological channel of dependency 
Whether the ongoing economic process that is being largely driven and directed by Beijing 
will result in changes to Africa‘s technological capabilities is as yet unclear. To date, the 
African side has seemed to place little emphasis on technological issues, in part to protect 
its workers and create jobs. To illustrate the technological and  innovation gap  between 
Africa  and  China,  Table  2  lists  the  rate  of  patent  applications  filled  in  select  African 
countries versus those in China during the 1997–2004 period. It is apparent that, in contrast 
to  the  exponential  expansion  of  patent  applications  in  China—from  24,774  in  1997  to 
130,384 seven years later—Africa has experienced no change.  
 
Table 2. Patent applications filled (resident and nonresident) 
Country/Organization  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
China  24774  47396  50044  67548  63450  80232  105317  130384 
African Intellectual Property Org.  261  261  65  297  67       
Kenya  62  33  55           
Madagascar      47  103  34  26  22  38 
Mauritius  15  15             
Malawi  28  20  1  20  313       
Zambia        39     31          
Source: World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO 2006 
Despite  the  Chinese  government‘s  pledge  to  take  a  positive  attitude  to  transferring 
technologies suitable for African countries, African dependency results naturally from the 
still-growing  technological  gap  and  international  division  of  trade.  Nevertheless,  even 
though not of China‘s making, this situation is one that China can help improve. That is, as 
China grows, its comparative advantage may well shift away from products of very low 
skill intensity; however, Africa could only jump successfully into that niche if it actively 
engages in an appropriate (i.e., tough not advanced) technological catch-up. It requires a 
significant level of absorptive capacity on the part of local suppliers and a complex process 
to internalize disseminated knowledge. 16 
 
Because the center-periphery economic relation is rooted in geography and technology, the 
best way to deal with a complex historical setting is to modify both the geographic and the 
technological  rapport.  The  policy  rubric  that  responds  to  this  new  consists  of  taking 
advantage  of  emerging  complementarities  with  the  global  scale  production  networks. 
Specifically, skill-intensive African firms must identify new niche markets and products in 
China, improve their competitiveness, and gain access to new Chinese markets exactly as 
done by the Chinese computer manufacturer, Lenovo, which has its executive headquarters 
in North Carolina, USA.   
V.  Concluding remarks 
This essay has explored the validity of Marxist dependency theories in the context of the 
emerging China-Africa trade and economic relations. Whereas dependency theory assumes 
that economic domination runs across north-south geoeconomic patterns, this discussion 
has shown that the China-Africa economic links represent a distinct south-south dialectic 
occurring in an emerging new global economic configuration marked by a technology gap.  
Therefore, the discussion fails to support the idea that China‘s involvement in Africa is of a 
conventional center-periphery type; which suggests the existence of nonexploitative, tough 
dependent,  trade  features.  This  dependence  implies  that  external  factors  and  decisions 
(included those related to China) also determine the real level of development in the Africa.  
Also worth mentioning is that for the first time Africa is drastically shifting its trade pattern 
away from its colonial framework: it too is becoming linked to a rapidly changing economy. 
Such a shift means that China‘s own constant economic and social structural changes make 
it easy for Africa to adjust to the emerging new global economic order.  
At the same time, the China-Africa relationship is marked by unavoidable dialectic tensions 
like labor and competition issues. Even though synergies can be created by considering 
China‘s legitimate interests in Africa and Africa‘s own legitimate rights, no matter how 
well-intentioned China is, Africa must still generate its own technological capacities and rid 
itself of its legendary rampant corruption. Thus, both sides must admit that there will be no 
long-run benefit unless each contributes to the emergence of a new economic configuration 
that is deeply rooted not in mutual but in common or joint interests. In this respect, the 
China-South  Africa  deal  to  set  up  a  joint  company  to  expand  ferrochrome  production 
represents a large step forward. 
  
As in any dialectic relationship, success in the China-Africa endeavor must be won as the 
result of social struggle, which implies that as a continent Africa must become stronger and 
make itself more attractive, not only as a source of raw materials but overall as a market 
and partner. The world is no longer clearly divided into center and periphery nations, or at 
least that description of world economic relations and development perspectives no longer 
holds in the form put forward by Presbich, Gunder Franck, and others. Rather, the China-
Africa relationship presents a case of intersystem dependency that should be both the future 
framework for the China-Africa relationship and the new direction for further research in 
dependency theories. 17 
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